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THE TAKING ISSUE TRILOGY: THE
BEGINNING OF THE END?
CHARLES L. SIEMON*
WENDY U. LARSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Following ten years of unsuccessful attempts,' the United States
Supreme Court finally reached the merits, or at least the peripheries of
the merits, of the so-called "taking issue"2 in a trilogy of cases: Key-
stone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis,3 First English Evangelical Lu-
* The authors are practicing attorneys, described by Professor Gideon Kanner and
attorney Michael Berger as "taking issue polemicists." Berger and Kanner, Thoughts
on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just
Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1985).
Although the authors represent both public and private sector clients in the land use
field, their writings in the taking issue area have been decidedly against compensation,
as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, philosophy and common sense. See, e.g.,
Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto,
9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984); The Paradox of "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan"
and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Effective Judicial Review of Land Use
Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REV. 603 (1987). The authors have been counsel of record
or have represented amici in a number of taking issue cases, including: Graham v.
Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); Pinellas County v. Brown, 420 So. 2d
308 (Fla. 1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981);
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
1. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer and Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
2. Bosselman, Callies and Banta, The Taking Issue (1973).
3. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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theran Church v. Los Angeles County4 and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.' First English, in which the Court supposedly reached
the critical6 "remedies" aspect of the taking issue,7 is the centerpiece of
the "trilogy." Unfortunately, despite the extensive media coverage the
case received,8 the constitutional significance and practical meaning of
First English is not readily apparent. Consideration of First English in
light of the Supreme Court's recent treatment of the taking issue, how-
ever, allows the contours of the taking issue to emerge.
The purpose of this Article is neither to revisit nor rehash the hoary
detail of the taking issue controversy. Rather, this Article explores the
contours of the taking issue in light of the Court's recent decisions and
describes, to the extent possible, the rules of law that currently control
police power regulation of land use.
II. THE TRILOGY
The three cases that comprise the "taking issue trilogy" involve dis-
tinct factual circumstances and legal questions. In Keystone 9 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a state statute which prohibited the
mining of coal that would result in surface subsidence.10 The Court
found that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power
and that the statute did not effect a taking. In First English 1 the
Court held that compensation is mandated when a governmental ac-
tion effects a taking, even if the taking is only temporary. The majority
opinion refused to define what constitutes a taking. In Nollanl2 the
4. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
5. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
6. This aspect is critical to those afraid of the "police power hawks." See Kanner,
Inverse Condemnation in an Era of Uncertainty, 1980 SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUN-
DATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT Do-
MAIN 177.
7. Although the "taking issue" has been much debated, a universally recognized
statement of the "issue" has yet to emerge. A review of the literature reveals at least
two separate issues: 1) under what circumstances does a regulation effect a taking in the
constitutional sense?; 2) if a regulation does effect a taking in the constitutional sense,
do the fifth and fourteenth amendments require compensation?
8. The media attention was sensational if not accurate.
9. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
10. Keystone involved the constitutionality of a coal mining subsidence act, the
same subject considered in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
12. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/5
THE TAKING ISSUE TRILOGY
Court held that a development permit condition effected a taking when
the condition failed to substantially advance a legitimate public inter-
est. Although the cases were factually and procedurally different, each
case involved the tension between state police power and fifth amend-
ment private property rights, and each contributes to an evolving defi-
nition of the taking issue.
A. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis 13 the Asso-
ciation of Coal Miners alleged that Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act14 violated the takings and con-
tract clauses of the United States Constitution. To avoid surface subsi-
dence, the Act prohibited the Association from mining twenty-seven
(27) million tons of coal. The Association argued that the restriction
on mining constituted a taking of that coal under Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon 15 and that the Act impaired the obligations of contracts. The
Association brought action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking to enjoin the State of Penn-
sylvania from enforcing the Act's provisions. Granting the state's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the District Court rejected the
Association's assertion that Pennsylvania Coal was controlling. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. On writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court held that the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act failed to constitute a taking.
The Association argued that Pennsylvania Coal controlled and that
the enactment of the Subsidence Act effected a taking. Writing for the
majority,16 Justice Stevens distinguished the Kohler Act in Penn-
sylvania Coal17 from the Subsidence Act in Keystone. Justice Stevens
initially observed that the record in Keystone, unlike the sparse record
supporting the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal,1 8 contained substan-
13. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
15. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
16. The majority was comprised of Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun.
17. 260 U.S. at 412.
18. The Court stated:
The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since the
statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of
the coal. Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety ... we
should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to
1988]
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tial factual support for the Subsidence Act. This evidence revealed that
mining-induced subsidence caused significant and widespread harm. 9
Noting that the Kohler Act was not a bona fide exercise of the police
power,z° the Court emphasized that Pennsylvania Coal had no influ-
ence on their determination of the Subsidence Act's constitutionality.
Determining the applicability of Pennsylvania Coal to Keystone, the
majority noted that the so-called regulatory taking aspect of Justice
Holmes' opinion was dictum, and therefore advisory. 1
The majority relied on the Pennsylvania legislature's findings both
that important public interests were at risk and that it designed the
Subsidence Act to minimize mining-induced subsidence. 2 Contrary to
warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected
rights.
Id. at 413-14.
19. Justice Stevens noted:
Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine, including the
land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal. This lowering of the
strata can have devastating effects. It often causes substantial damage to founda-
tions, walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and buildings.
Subsidence frequently causes sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land
difficult or impossible to develop. Its effect on farming has been well docu-
mented-many subsided areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared. Subsidence
can also cause the loss of groundwater and surface ponds. In short, it presents the
type of environmental concern that has been the focus of so much federal, state and
local regulation in recent decades.
107 S. Ct. at 1237.
20. The coal company argued that the Kohler Act "was not a bona fide exercise of
the police power, but in reality was nothing more than 'robbery under the form of law'"
because its purpose was "not to protect the lives or safety of the public generally but
merely to augment the property rights of a favored few." Id. at 1241.
21. The fact that Holmes' opinion was dictum does not affect the Court's analysis
and merely stimulates a snide reference in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent. He states,
"In apparent recognition of the obstacles presented by Pennsylvania Coal to the decision
it reaches, the Court attempts to undermine the authority of Justice Holmes' opinion as
to the validity of the Kohler Act, labelling it 'uncharacteristically... advisory.'" Id. at
1253.
22. The statute states:
This Act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the Common-
wealth for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people of
the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of surface land areas which
may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal by methods other than 'open pit'
or 'strip' mining, to aid in the protection of the safety of the public, to enhance the
value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface water drainage
and public water supplies and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such
lands and to maintain primary jurisdiction over surface coal mining in
Pennsylvania.
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the circumstances surrounding the Kohler Act, the Court found that
the Subsidence Act challenged in Keystone lacked indicia of a statute
enacted solely to benefit private parties.23 Although rejected by the
Court in Pennsylvania Coal, the majority in Keystone accepted the
proposition that the legislation was intended to protect the public inter-
est in health, the environment and the fiscal integrity of the area, rather
than to prevent damage to private landowners' homes.24
Moreover, the Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal from Keystone
in terms of the respective prohibitions on mining.2 5 The Keystone ma-
jority determined that the issue was whether the regulations, as applied
to the plaintiff's property, violated regulatory taking principles by
PA. ANN. STAT. tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
23. 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
24. After concluding that the instant matter was distinguishable from the statute in
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court answered what it characterized as an implicit assertion
that Pennsylvania Coal had overruled the principles of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887). In Mugler, a Kansas distiller challenged a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages as an unconstitutional tak-
ing of its property. The Supreme Court recognized that the practical effect of the chal-
lenged provision was such that the distiller's machinery and buildings constituting a
brewery were "of little value," but nevertheless rejected the challenge. Justice Harlan
explained the Court's holding and established the dichotomy between the police power
and the power of eminent domain that has been characterized as overruled in Penn-
sylvania Coal, that is, that a
prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, can-
not, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or appropriation of property. ... The
power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their prop-
erty as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is
not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society cannot
be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permit-
ted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, rejected the implied
assertion and affirmatively stated that the Court in Pennsylvania Coal could not have
intended to overrule Mugler and its kin because just five years after Pennsylvania Coal,
Justice Holmes joined the Court's unanimous decision in Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928), holding that the Takings Clause did
not require the State of Virginia to compensate the owners of cedar trees for the
value of the trees that the State had ordered destroyed .... [I]t was clear that the
State's exercise of its police power to prevent the impending danger was justified,
and did not require compensation.
107 S. Ct. at 1244-45.
25. 260 U.S. at 414. The Court in Pennsylvania Coal found that the Kohler Act had
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying the
coal. Id.
1988]
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making commercially impracticable the mining of "certain coal."2 6
First, without attribution of authority, the Court stated that one alleg-
ing a regulatory taking must satisfy a heavy burden.27 The Court em-
phasized that petitioner made merely a facial challenge to the
Subsidence Act, and therefore, the "only question before this court is
whether the mere enactment of the statutes and the regulations consti-
tutes a taking."28 Citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Assn., Inc.,29 the Court noted that the mere enactment of a
statute is unlikely to create a sufficient factual controversy to support a
takings claim. As a result, the petitioner faced "an uphill battle in
making a facial attack on the Act as a taking."'
The second step in the Court's takings analysis necessitated a
"before and after" valuation of the petitioner's property interest.
31
This step, in turn, required the Court to determine which "unit of
property" it had to evaluate. The majority stated that according to
Penn Central a takings analysis should consider the affected property
as a whole and avoid evaluating the impact of the regulatory program
on individual interests.3 2  The Court determined that the relevant
property was the Association's entire holdings. Rejecting the Associa-
tion's definition of the unit of property as the 27 million tons of coal
which the Act prohibited removing, the Court identified 1.46 billion
tons, located in thirteen (13) mines, as the subject of its diminution of
26. What the majority intended to refer to as "our regulatory taking cases" is un-
clear; however, the balance of the opinion suggests that Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), is the centerpiece of those cases.
27. 107 S. Ct. at 1246.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
30. 107 S. Ct. at 1247. Justice Stevens went on to note that the "hill is especially
steep because petitioners have not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it commer-
cially impracticable to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in Western Penn-
sylvania." Id. at 1247-48.
31. Although the Court does not cite authority for the "before and after" value rule,
it is clear that the Court is applying the takings analysis described in Penn Central.
32. 438 U.S. at 130-31. The Court found that:
Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Id. (emphasis added). Applying the test, the Penn Central Court found that the parcel
as a whole was the city tax block designated as the landmark site.
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value test.33
The Court attempted to reconcile its unit of property analysis with
the analysis in Pennsylvania Coal34 that implied that a taking occurs
regardless of the amount of coal the mining prohibition affects.3 5 The
Court in Pennsylvania Coal stated:
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional pur-
poses as appropriating or destroying it.36
The Court in Keystone read the "certain coal" clause in conjunction
with the conclusion in Pennsylvania Coal that the Kohler Act pre-
vented commercially feasible mining. Therefore, the Court in Penn-
sylvania Coal had used a "unit of property" consonant with the unit
the Keystone Court identified.
Using the 1.46 billion ton figure, the Court calculated that the Subsi-
dence Act diminished the value of the Association's coal interests by
merely two (2) percent.37 In other words, the Court's diminution of
value test revealed that the mere enactment of the Subsidence Act and
its implementing regulations did not interfere with reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations. The Court concluded that the petitioners
failed to establish that the regulation denied them economically viable
use of their property.38
The Association next claimed that since Pennsylvania enacted spe-
cific legislation recognizing the "support estate,", 39 the Court should
consider the support estate alone as the relevant property unit for their
taking analysis. The Association argued that in authorizing the trans-
fer of the support estate as a separate interest in real property, the legis-
lature had, as a matter of law, defined the unit of property to be the
support estate. Applying their own version of the Court's diminution
of value test, the Association urged that the Subsidence Act rendered
33. 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
34. Id. at 1249.
35. Id.
36. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (emphasis added).
37. This diminution is slight in contrast to other decisions of the Supreme Court.
For example, in the landmark zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), the reduction in value was 75%.
38. 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
39. -The support estate consists of the right to remove the strata of coal and earth
that undergird the surface or to leave those layers intact to support the surface and
prevent subsidence." Id. at 1250 (quoting from the court of appeals).
1988]
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the support estate valueless. The Association contended that the Act
gave the surface owner stable land without having to pay the mine
owners to acquire the support estate.
The Court rejected the Association's argument for two reasons.
First, the Court again noted that taking jurisprudence does not divide
property into distinct segments. Furthermore, although one could con-
vey the support estate as a discrete interest, it was nevertheless just
another strand in the bundle of property rights.4° The second reason
concerned the practical aspects of the support estate and value. The
Court concluded that the support estate, though undoubtedly valuable
in its own right, is profitable only in conjunction with another estate,
such as the surface estate or the mineral estate.41 Stating that even if it
accepted the Association's view of the support estate as a distinct inter-
est, the Court held that the Association had failed to satisfy the heavy
burden of a facial taking challenge.42
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, and Justices Powell, O'Connor
and Scalia joined in his opinion. For Rehnquist the case was simple.
Rehnquist stated that for fifty-five years Pennsylvania Coal was the
foundation of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. Keystone,
Rehnquist continued, interfered with private coal mining interests in a
manner strikingly similar to the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal.43
Rehnquist disputed both that the Subsidence Act is factually distin-
guishable from the Kohler Act as a statute directed at a legitimate pub-
lic objective, and that the Act does not interfere with investment-
backed expectations. The dissent critically reviewed Pennsylvania Coal
to show factual similarities with Keystone far greater than the majority
suggested. The Chief Justice completed his challenge to the majority's
factual distinction succinctly, stating:
Thus, it is clear that the Court has severely understated the simi-
larity of purpose between the Subsidence Act and the Kohler Act.
40. In effect, the Court simply rejected the Association's attempt to persuade the
Court that distinct status under state law defined the unit of property in the takings
analysis equation.
41. Id. Consistent with the court of appeals, the Court noted:
although Pennsylvania law does recognize the support estate as a 'separate' prop-
erty interest, it cannot be used profitably by one who does not also possess either
the mineral estate or the surface estate.
Id.
42. The majority opinion goes on to discuss the Association's contracts clause
challenge.
43. Id. at 1253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The public purposes in this case are not sufficient to distinguish it
from Pennsylvania Coal."
Nevertheless, the dissent shifted its focus from Pennsylvania Coal and
went on to the "real" issue.45
According to the Chief Justice, the threshold question in a takings
analysis is the nature of the government's purposes involved. In other
words, if the purpose of the regulation is to eliminate a "nuisance",
then the government would not have to pay compensation, and there
would be no taking.g6 Although not relying on the principle, the ma-
jority indicated that the nuisance exception might support its position
that no taking had occurred. Rehnquist disagreed and explained that
the restricted activity in Keystone is not the type of regulation held to
be within the nuisance exception. Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that
the nuisance exception was narrow and allowed the government to pre-
vent a misuse of property. The nuisance exception in no way condones
the prevention of a legal and essential use or an attribute of the prop-
erty's ownership.47 Explaining the substantive basis for the "narrow
exception" and the purpose of restricting its use, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist turned to what he perceived to be the concerns underlying the
fifth amendment.48
44. Id. at 1255.
45. Id. at 1256. The dissent opined:
The similarity of the public purpose of the present Act to that in Pennsylvania Coal
does not resolve the question of whether a taking has occurred; the existence of
such a public purpose is merely a necessary prerequisite to the government's exer-
cise of its taking power.
Id. This passage is difficult to understand in the context of Justice Scalia's opinion in
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), in which the Chief Justice
joined In Nollan Justice Scalia stated that a regulation which does not substantially
advance a legitimate public interest is a taking. How can a regulation which fails the
"necessary predicate to the government's.., taking power" test described by Rehn-
quist, still be a taking?
46. Justice Rehnquist stated:
we have recognized that a taking does not occur where a government exercises its
unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using his property to
injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use.
Id. at 1256.
47. The circularity of the point is obvious. If a state law declares a use to be "ille-
gal" then the "narrow exception" comes into play, i.e., any regulation comes within the
exception.
48. Id. He wrote:
[the Fifth Amendment] prevent[s] the 'public from loading upon one individual
more than his share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surren-
ders to the public something more and different from that which is extracted from
19881
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For the Chief Justice, the nuisance exception has only minimal ap-
plication because of two narrowing principles. First, courts should
limit the exception to regulations directed at discrete and narrow pur-
poses, as distinguished from general economic regulations, which
Rehnquist finds less important.4 9 Second, the nuisance exception has
never warranted complete extinction of a parcel of property's value.50
In support of the latter proposition, the Chief Justice relied upon
Mugler v. Kansas51 to point out that although the result of a prohibi-
tion on a brewery was significant, it failed to violate the nuisance ex-
ception because "the prohibition on [the] manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors made the distiller's brewery 'of little value', but did
not completely extinguish the value of the building."52
Equally surprising is the Chief Justice's invocation of Miller v.
Schoene53 for the proposition that the Court has never authorized the
complete extinction of the value of property. Miller provided a clear
articulation of the government's authority to completely destroy prop-
erty to abate a nuisance. Of course, Miller is only one of the cases in
which the Supreme Court allowed the complete destruction of property
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.' A
broad exception to the operation of the Just Compensation Clause based on the
exercise of the multifaceted health, welfare, and safety regulations would surely
allow government much greater authority than we have recognized to impose soci-
etal burdens on individual landowners, for nearly every action the government
takes is intended to secure for the public an extra measure of 'health, safety and
welfare.'
Id. at 1256-57.
49. It is impossible to discern whether Chief Justice Rehnquist actually intended to
establish a hierarchy of regulatory purposes, or whether his musings are more accu-
rately described as argumentatively directed to the majority opinion. When it is recal-
led that the majority did not in fact rely on the nuisance exception, the dissent's protests
prove "too much."
50. This last proposition would undoubtedly not rest well with the owners of dis-
eased plants and animals that have been completely destroyed to avoid the spread of
disease. The value of animals destroyed annually to avoid the introduction of diseases
in the country and protect the poultry industry is substantial. Owners have accepted
these losses for years on the assumption that the complete destruction of a nuisance is
not compensable under the takings clause.
51. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
52. 107 S. Ct. at 1257. The distinction between the phrases "of little value" and
"completely extinguishes the value of the building" is one of little difference.
53. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Miller involved an economic protection regulation (in the
hierarchy implied by Rehnquist, a less important purpose). The cedar trees, which the
statute required to be destroyed to prevent a disease that affected apple trees, were virtu-
ally valueless except for firewood.
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without payment of just compensation. The dog case54 and the alco-
holic beverage cases55 are examples of a tradition in the law that the
Chief Justice failed to mention. Clearly, the complete destruction of
alcoholic beverages required no compensation because it was a public
action designed to eliminate a public nuisance.
The Chief Justice further confused his discussion by asserting that in
none of the preceding cases "did the regulation destroy essential uses of
private property.",5 6 Rehnquist overlooked that in each of the cases he
referred to the regulation not only destroyed substantial uses, but also
extinguished all possible property uses in some cases. Even if Rehn-
quist intended the word "essential" to denote the minimum use that is
the benchmark of a regulatory taking, his statement ignored many de-
cisions in which the Court sanctioned the complete destruction of nui-
sances without payment of just compensation.
The Chief Justice abruptly changed course and concluded that the
enactment of the Subsidence Act completely destroyed the Associa-
tion's interest in the 27 million tons of coal.57 Chief Justice Rehnquist
made two arguments to support this claim. First, the Act destroyed
the value of the property. The mining prohibition rendered a land-
owner's interest in his coal valueless.58 Second, the Chief Justice de-
fined the relevant unit of property differently than did the majority.59
Rehnquist's view of the relevant parcel of land differed dramatically
from that of the majority, and his analysis left unanswered many ques-
tions. According to Justice Rehnquist, the majority erred in conclud-
ing that the coal constituted a single indivisible property unit. The
Chief Justice argued that the majority erred in failing to distinguish
between regulatory takings and physical invasions. A physical inva-
54. Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
55. The leading case is Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); see also Clark v.
Haberle Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
56. 107 S. Ct. at 1257.
57, Id.
58. The Chief Justice did not attempt to deal with the record in Keystone which
clearly indicated that the support estate had value to both the mineral estate and the
surface or use estate.
59. He stated:
the Court's broad definition of the 'relevant mass of property' . . . allows it to
ascribe to the Subsidence Act a less pernicious effect on the interests of the prop-
erty owner. The need to consider the effect of regulation on some identifiable seg-
ment of property makes all important the admittedly difficult task of defining the
relevant parcel.
Id.
19881
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sion is always a taking because a deprivation of property use, no matter
how small, is a taking.6 ° In contrast, allegations of a regulatory taking
necessitate an analysis of the regulation's impact on the affected
property.
At this point in the dissent, the Chief Justice attempted a feat of
analytical legerdemain. The Chief Justice argued that a physical occu-
pation is always a taking,61 whereas only some regulatory actions are
takings. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that regulations, unlike phys-
ical invasions, do not typically extinguish the full bundle of rights in a
particular piece of property. He argued that the Court must evaluate
the effects of governmental action in light of the factors enumerated in
Penn Central. These factors include: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character
of the governmental action.62 These analytical steps are unnecessary in
the event of a physical invasion. In other words, the Chief Justice ar-
gued that it is not necessary to apply the takings analysis established in
Penn Central when a party alleges that a regulation destroys all use of
property. The Chief Justice's sleight of hand thereby disposed of "tak-
ing jurisprudence" and the need for the majority's relevant unit of
property analysis.
The trouble is that Rehnquist's opinion is contrary to a century of
established law. Indeed, replacing the references to 27 million tons of
coal in the argument with references to additional rents, 63 air rights,6'
or building setbacks, 65 reveals the contradictions inherent in the Chief
Justice's argument. Although the Court has never held that a regula-
tion preventing landowners from building above a prescribed height or
beyond a setback constitutes a taking of what is an identifiable and
separable segment of property, the Chief Justice ultimately adopted
this position. Chief Justice Rehnquist further argued that the status of
60. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See
also Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
61. This proposition is flatly rejected in Nollan, where Justice Scalia states that a
physical occupation that would otherwise constitute a taking would not be a taking
where the occupation substantially advances a legitimate public interest. Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Scalia's opinion.
62. 107 S. Ct. at 1259.
63. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
64. Id. See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
65. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1928).
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the support estate, recognized as a separate interest in property, rein-
forced his conclusion that the Subsidence Act effects a taking. The
Chief Justice forcefully asserted that the Court has always looked to
state law66 to define property and that the majority's rejection of the
support estate as a separate and distinct interest is inappropriate.
Again, having succeeded in articulating a basis for evaluating the regu-
lation's impact on the 27 million tons of coal, the dissent argued that
the Act effects a taking.
The significance of Keystone lies in the takings analysis that the
Court employed to evaluate the impact of the regulation. A majority
of the Court reaffirmed that absent a physical invasion, the Court looks
to the impact of the governmental action on investment backed devel-
opment expectations and employs the analysis set forth in Penn Cen-
tral.6 7 In particular, the Keystone Court affirmed that taking
jurisprudence does not separate property into discrete segments for a
takings analysis. Rather, the Court looks at the property as a whole.
B. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Los Angeles County
The centerpiece of the taking issue trilogy, First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,6 8 involved a facial challenge
to a temporary floodplain ordinance adopted by Los Angeles County.
The Church owned a 21 acre parcel of land in a steep valley subject to
periodic flooding. A flood had destroyed a series of camp buildings
used for retreats and other purposes. In response to the flood, Los
Angeles County adopted a temporary regulation that prohibited fur-
ther development in the area subject to flooding. The ordinance con-
tained no permitting or variance procedures. The Church sued the
County, claiming that the ordinance denied the landowner all use of
his property. The California Supreme Court, adhering to the principles
of Agins v. City of Tiburon,69 denied the Church's claims that enact-
ment of the ordinance constituted a taking. The court ruled that under
California law the Church's allegations sounding in inverse condemna-
tion were irrelevant because the only relief the Church sought was just
66. The Chief Justice's argument is extremely clever on this point, but it conflicts
with the settled proposition that although state law defines property, federal law defines
takings.
67. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
68. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
69. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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compensation and money damages.7" The Church appealed and the
California Court of Appeals declined the Church's entreaties to recon-
sider the Agins rule. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court finally
considered the merits of the taking issue.71
For taking mavens of the no-compensation persuasion,72 the fact
that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the decision in First English
portended bad news. After all, Rehnquist had dissented in Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Company v. City of New York 73 and had stated in
his concurring opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Di-
ego74 that he agreed with much of Justice Brennan's now-famous dis-
sent.75 Furthermore, Rehnquist had suggested, that a total use
prohibition of even part of a parcel of property constituted a compensa-
ble taking in his bitter dissent in Keystone.76
The opinion of the Court requires careful, almost laborious analysis,
and even then, the import of the opinion lies hidden between the lines.
According to the Chief Justice, the issue before the Court was whether
a landowner who claims that an ordinance denies him the use of his
property may recover damages for the period before the court finally
determines that the regulation constitutes a taking. The Court an-
swered this question affirmatively.77
First English is really two cases. There is the action the Supreme
Court actually decided, and there is the case the taking issue devotees
wished the parties had submitted to the Court. The actual case in-
volved a narrow legal question, to which there was only one answer. If
there is a taking, regardless of its cause or duration, the Constitution
mandates that government pay just compensation to the landowner.
Although the Court established this principle decades ago, the First
70. 107 S. Ct. at 2385.
71. Id. at 2383. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 72 (1980); San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Williamson County v. Hamilton
Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106
S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
72. The authors are clearly members of the no-compensation camp.
73. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
74. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
75. Justice Rehnquist stated: "If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a 'final
judgment or decree' of the California Court of Appeals, as that term is used in 28 U.S.C.
1257, I would.have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Brennan." 450 U.S. at 633-34.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 45-74.
77. 107 S. Ct. at 2381.
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English reiteration of it in the context of a rambling, disjunctive dis-
course about taking precedents does nothing but confuse what has al-
ready been recognized as a "Serbian bog." The parties' use of the
Supreme Court as a forum to debate the tangential issue of how to
determine when a taking occurs added to the confusion.
After noting that the ordinances in question created a regulatory
taking, the Court expressly disavowed any intention to address
whether the regulations in fact effected a taking.7" The Court com-
menced its analysis of the "remedy" question by referring to the lan-
guage of the fifth amendment. Making an oblique observation that the
language does not prohibit governmental taking of private property,
the Court stated that instead the takings clause places a condition of
repayment on the exercise of that power.7 9
The Court continued its unnecessary play on words by pointing to a
landowner's right to bring an inverse condemnation action because of
the self-executing nature of the takings clause.8" It is curious why the
Court felt obligated to consider this proposition in light of the fact that
the Agins rule permits a landowner's right to "self-execute" on the con-
stitutional imperative for just compensation. The Court answered the
constitutional challenge to the Agins rule by restating the rule in lan-
guage that admits to only one answer. The Supreme Court, having
reformed the question presented to its liking, concluded that any taking
requires compensation, hardly a novel proposition. Although most
78. The Court stated:
We ... have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied
appellant all use of its property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion
that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use
was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations. Those
questions, of course, remain open for decision on the remand we direct today.
Id. at 2384-85 (citations omitted). Although it is probably unfair to quibble with the
Chief Justice's language, this quote contains a number of troubling references. For ex-
ample, the Court invokes the concept of "compensable taking." Does the Court mean
that there are non-compensable takings? Similarly, how does the Court's avoidance of
the "safety" issue square with Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Keystone?
79, Id. at 2385. The Court argued:
This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.
Id. This, of course, disposes of the taking issue by simple word play, a particularly
surprising turn of events in light of the obvious conflict with Pennsylvania Coal. Rehn-
quist posits that the compensation clause is not a limit on governmental power, even
though that was the very essence of Pennsylvania Coal.
80. Id. at 2386.
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takings result from exercises of the governmental power of eminent do-
main, the Court pointed out that inverse condemnation is predicated
on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal pro-
ceedings. The Court cited Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co."' to support its
statement, even though the case had nothing to do with overzealous
regulatory actions.
It is curious that the Court used Pumpelly as a doctrinal source for a
legal principle that directly conflicts with the Court's holding in
Mugler v. Kansas."2 Pumpelly preceded Mugler by 15 years and was
distinguished in Mugler. Moreover, in Pumpelly the governmental ac-
tion in question did not involve a prohibition on private use of private
land. To the contrary, it involved a physical occupation that irrepara-
bly destroyed the value of the property.8 3
Justice Rehnquist nevertheless elevated the Pumpelly concept that a
physical occupation creates a taking even without a formal exercise of
the power of eminent domain to regulatory taking doctrine. To sup-
port this proposition, Rehnquist cited Kaiser Aetna v. United States,84
United States v. Dickinson " and United States v. Causby,86 cases that
involved actual invasions of property interests. In doing so, the Court
made a leap of faith that overcomes the taking issue by applying the
rules for uncompensated physical occupations to the regulatory taking
context without explanation or precedent. Using simple word play, the
Court avoided the lower California courts' holding and redefined the
issue so as to disguise it with tautology. A quote the Court included
from Agins highlights the emptiness of the Court's analysis:
In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom in the
land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force
which inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy, persuade us
that on balance mandamus or declaratory relief rather than in-
81. 80 U.S. 166 (1872).
82. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
83. The Court stated: "It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result... [if]
it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real
property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable
and permanent injury to any extent, can, in affect, subject it to total destruction without
making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for
the public use." 80 U.S. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
84. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
85. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
86. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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verse condemnation is the appropriate relief under the
circumstances.
This passage illustrates that the California courts have concluded that
a regulation which goes too far is not an "otherwise proper" exercise of
governmental power.87
The Court next embarked on a remarkably confusing passage. First,
citing to Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States88 and United
States v. Dow,8 9 the Court stated that it previously recognized that gov-
ernment may abandon its intrusion or discontinue regulations.90
Neither the purpose nor the placement of this statement in the Court's
analysis is clear, and it adds nothing to the Court's ultimate decision.91
Next, the Court stated that it had yet to resolve whether the govern-
ment, after discontinuing its regulations, must compensate for the pe-
riod of time during which an ordinance denies a landowner all use of
his land.92 This statement contradicts the Court's prior dismissal of
the issue of what constitutes a compensable event as an issue outside
the Court's agenda.93
The Court then considered the relevance of the temporary nature of
the governmental interference. Supplanting the most important issue
in the taking controversy, the Court begged the question of whether
interference with private use for a short period of time during which an
overly restrictive regulation is in effect is a taking. Instead, the Court
addressed the self-fulfilling question of whether there can ever be a
temporary taking.94 It is hard to believe that the Court questioned
87. 107 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 378 (1979)).
88. 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
89. 357 U.S. 17 (1958).
90. 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
91. Initially, it appears that the Court is reflecting on the well-settled principle that
the abandonment of eminent domain proceedings, absent actual possession of the object
of the condemnation effort, does not effect a compensable taking; however, the balance
of the paragraph suggests that the statement has little to do with the Court's analysis
and that the concept of abandonment is of no analytical significance.
92. Id. at 2387.
93. It is tempting to suspect that the Court has a hidden agenda and is intent on
deciding the issue that has evaded Supreme Court articulation because of the absurd
finality rules that the Court has erected in lieu of discharging its role to clarify the law.
This case avoided the finality rule because the question of a taking was clear, yet the
Court attempts to edge into what constitutes a taking.
94. The Court's analytical approach takes a series of non-questions and substitutes
them for the merits of the taking issue. No one, of course, ever doubted that there could
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whether temporary takings are compensable under the fifth
amendment.95
Nevertheless, as strange and oblique as the Court's opinion has been
to this point, the Court's next observation is even more surprising. The
Court founded its analysis that a non-occupation interference is a tak-
ing on Pumpelly. In Pumpelly the Court characterized governmental
intrusions that fell short of an absolute conversion of real property as a
taking when the government "destroy[s] its value entirely, can inflict
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent...in effect, subject it to
total destruction." 96 Simply put, the Chief Justice argued that the in-
verse condemnation right is based on Pumpelly, a case which equated
permanent and irreparable injuries to a taking. He then stated that
nothing requires that takings be permanent or irreparable. This leap of
reasoning conveniently obviates the need for consideration of the real
merits of the taking issue.97
The Court, after having rambled through the taking issue, an-
nounced that it did not intend First English to abrogate the principle
that the choice to exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative
decision. 98 It is difficult to ascertain why the Court felt compelled to
disclaim this proposition. An earlier part of the opinion stated that the
question of just compensation was separate from the nature of the gov-
ernmental power involved.9 9 The State of California had obviously ar-
be temporary takings. The law is settled that a taking for a period of time is a compen-
sable taking. Indeed, the historical antecedents of the just compensation clause are de-
rived from temporary takings, the occupation of private quarters by troops during
periods of conflict. The Court's citation of authority for temporary takings indicates the
preposterous nature of the "self-executing" question posited by the Court. The Chief
Justice concluded:
'temporary' takings, which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are
not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly
requires compensation.
Id. at 2388.
95. The real issue is not whether a taking can be temporary, but whether a tempo-
rary interference in all use of property is a taking. That question was not before the
Court because of the finality rule.
96. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
97. The type of governmental interference that the Court has equated with a taking
in the physical occupation cases is very different from the interference in an overly
restrictive regulation case. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice attempted to avoid the long-
standing distinction between occupation cases and regulatory cases by simply ignoring
the distinction.
98. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
99. Id. at 2383.
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gued that inverse condemnation violated the separation of powers by
allowing the Court to judicially transform a regulatory effort into an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. The Court had long since
disposed of this question in Mugler v. Kansas,"° and it was not even
before the Court in First English. Nevertheless, the Court dealt with
the issue by simply denying the validity of the State of California's
contentions.
The Court further qualified its dictum by reaffirming that the opin-
ion is based on the assumption that the regulations constituted a regu-
latory taking and is limited to the facts presented. Moreover, Chief
Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Court would be confronting dif-
ferent questions in the case of normal delays in obtaining building per-
mits, changes in zoning ordinance, variances, and the like. 1° ' The
significance of this limiting section is unclear. Although impossible to
ascertain from the opinion, perhaps the Court is implying that a sus-
pension of all use of property for a period of time will not necessarily
constitute a taking.
10 2
The Court directs its final disclaimer at the anticipated impact of the
holding on the freedom and flexibility of land use planners and munici-
palities. The Court dismisses raids on the public fisc as a necessary
consequence of the Constitution. The Court stated:
As Justice Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, 'a strong
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change." 3
100. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
101. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
102. The inclusion of this passage is particularly strange given the absolutist view of
the compensation clause that was set forth in the Chief Justice's dissent in Keystone
Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1253 (1987).
103. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). Although the Chief
Justice invoked Holmes in support of the Court's decision, he overlooked the fact that
Holmes' opinion made it clear that:
[siome values are enjoyed under the implied limitations and must yield to the po-
lice power. But obviously, the implied limitation must have its limits, or the con-
tract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not all cases there must be an exercise of the power of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.
Id. at 413 (emphasis added). The Chief Justice probably ignored this passage because it
could not be reconciled with the literal reading of a portion of the Holmes' opinion
necessary to the Court's analysis.
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Then, in an apologetic but confusing style, the Court reiterates its
holding:
Here we must assume that the Los Angeles County ordinances
have denied appellant all use of its property for a considerable
period of years and we hold that invalidation of the ordinance
without payment of fair value for the use of the property during
this period of time would be a constitutionally insufficient
remedy. "
Presumably, this passage suggests that when a taking occurs, compen-
sation must be paid, and that the Court did not intend to address when
a regulatory taking can exist.'" 5 Moreover, the Court did not intend to
require compensation for every overly restrictive regulation.
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor.10 6 The dissent criticized the Court for rendering an opinion
that would generate a great deal of unproductive litigation. Justice Ste-
vens stated:
the mere duty to defend the actions that today's decision will
spawn will undoubtedly have a significant adverse impact on the
land-use regulatory process. The Court has reached out to ad-
dress an issue not actually presented in this case, and has then
answered that self-imposed question in a superficial and, I believe,
dangerous way. 107
Justice Stevens identified several flaws in the majority's decision.
First, he argued that the Court had the authority to decide that the
complaint failed to allege a taking under the Constitution. Justice Ste-
vens argued that the allegations of the complaint did not necessarily
allege a taking under the precedents of the Court. 108 Justice Stevens
began his analysis with the proposition that "all property in this coun-
try is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community."10 9 The fact that the complaint
104. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
105. The Chief Justice identified the "safety" justification as a regulatory limit on all
use that might not be a taking, and identified "normal delays" for permitting as an
interference with all use of property for a period of time that would not be a taking. Id.
at 2389.
106. Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor joined Parts I and III of the Stevens'
dissent. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens were aligned with each other in all three
of the trilogy cases.
107. Id. at 2390.
108. Id. at 2391.
109. Id.
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alleged that the regulations deny the landowner all use of its property
does not necessarily mean that the Court must assume that the com-
plaint alleges a taking. The Chief Justice recognized this principle
when he admitted that the "safety" justification for regulation might
avoid a taking,11° and when he admitted that not all prohibitions on
use for a period of time constitute a taking.1 ' According to Justice
Stevens, the complaint did not allege a taking, and therefore the Court
should not have reached the merits.
In Part II of the dissent, 1 2 Justice Stevens outlined the second flaw
of the majority opinion. Stevens agreed that the Court must find that
an overextensive regulation constitutes a taking. Nevertheless, he
wrote that when a regulation goes too far, "the Government has a
choice: it may abandon the regulation or it may continue to regulate
and compensate those whose property it takes."'13 Although a regula-
tion may effect a temporary taking, not every interference rises to the
level of a taking. 4 The question, Justice Stevens stated, is whether the
regulations have "such severe consequences that invalidation or repeal
will not 'mitigate' the damage enough to remove the 'taking.' "115
The dissent then observed that an essential element of the regulatory
taking equation is the diminution in value test, a concept unique to
regulatory takings. The dissent explained that the rationale for this
distinction is that although "physical invasions ... are relatively rare
and easily identifiable without making any economic analysis, regula-
tory programs constantly affect property values in countless ways, and
only the most extreme regulations can constitute takings."'1 16 The fail-
ure to recognize this distinction constitutes the second flaw in the ma-
110. Id. at 2384-85. He stated:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually
denied appellant all use of its property or whether the county might avoid the con-
clusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all
use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations.
Id. (emphasis added).
111, Id. at 2389.
112, Neither Justice Blackmun or Justice O'Connor joined in Part II.
113. Id. at 2393.
114. Id.
115. Id. The dissent's view of the question is that very different rules apply in re-
gard to determining what is a taking in the context of physical occupation and non-
occupation activities.
116. Id.
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jority's opinion.117
According to Stevens, the majority's conclusion that the application
of the Los Angeles County ordinance constituted a "temporary taking"
ignored the economic analysis required for determining whether a reg-
ulatory taking has occurred. The majority ignored the fact that a tem-
porary interference in the private use of property may involve an
inconsequential diminution in value that does not constitute a taking.
On the other hand, Justice Stevens accepted the proposition that even a
temporary use interference substantially affects the value of property so
as to constitute a taking. The majority's flaw was in failing to analyze
the economic impact of the Los Angeles County ordinance; the Court
concluded that it had no choice but to accept the conclusion that the
regulation affected a taking.
Justice Stevens stated that the majority's rejection of the distinction
between physical occupation cases and regulatory taking cases is based
on precedents that did not involve the diminution in value test. In-
deed, Justice Stevens wrote that the Court's citation to the temporary
occupation cases in the context of a regulatory taking case are not rele-
vant to the proper inquiry-the extent of the diminution of value. He
stated:
Why should there be a constitutional distinction between a perma-
nent restriction that only reduces the economic value of the prop-
erty by a fraction-perhaps one-third-and a restriction that
merely postpones the development of a property for a fraction of
its useful life-presumably far less than a third? In the former
instance, no taking has occurred; in the latter case, the Court now
proclaims that compensation for a taking must be provided."'
C. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
The last of the 1987 trilogy of taking cases; Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 119 presented an opportunity for the Court to clar-
ify some of the confusion in First English regarding exactions and the
takings clause. As in First English, however, the Court failed to eluci-
117. It is debatable whether the second flaw actually exists, because the majority
purports to accept that a taking has in fact been alleged and that the Court has no
alternative but to accept that allegation given the procedural posture of the case. Ste-
vens disagreed and pointed out that the assumption is flawed. That does not necessarily
mean that the Court actually reached the issue of what constitutes a taking, the objec-
tive of Part II of the dissent.
118. Id. at 2395.
119. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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date these important issues. Moreover, the disagreement between the
majority and the dissent about the standard of review further muddled
the discussion.
In Nollan a divided Supreme Court invalidated a beach access condi-
tion the California Coastal Commission imposed on a building permit
it granted. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White, Powell and O'Connor, authored the majority opinion.
Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens dissented separately.
In Nollan the purchaser of a tract of land on the coast sought per-
mission from the California Coastal Commission to construct a home
on the lot. The purchaser's contract required that the buyer demolish
a small dilapidated bungalow located on the property. The Coastal
Commission gave notice that it intended to grant the requested permit.
In adherence to Commission policy and practice (at least 43 prior per-
mits in the area contained the same condition), the Coastal Commis-
sion conditioned the permit on the Nollan's granting of a public access
easement across a portion of the lot along the beach. The area of ac-
cess was seaward of an eight foot seawall on the lot.
After unsuccessfully protesting the easement requirement before the
Coastal Commission, the Nollans challenged the constitutionality of
the condition in state court. The Nollans alleged that the condition
was a taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion. Seeking only to have the condition invalidated, the Nollans did
not bring an action for inverse condemnation. While litigation was
pending, the Nollans closed on the property and, pursuant to the issued
permit, constructed a new house in excess of twenty-four hundred
square feet.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court decision
and upheld the condition as constitutional. The court reasoned that a
required conveyance was constitutional where the exaction was suffi-
ciently related to the burdens created by the project. When the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declined to review the case, the landowner
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court re-
versed the California Court of Appeal, holding that the condition vio-
lated the takings clause and was therefore invalid. The Court
summarily determined that this exercise of power was beyond the
state's legitimate interests. 120 Unfortunately, the Court's opinion, con-
sistent with First English, fails to define the limits of the taking clause.
120. Id. at 3148. "Whatever may be the outer limits of legitimate state interests in
the taking and land use context, this is not one of them." Id. (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the Court failed to explain how the taking clause should
be applied to the law of exactions. The Court required interested par-
ties to read between the lines.
The Coastal Commission set forth two arguments in support of the
beach access condition. First, the Commission maintained that they
could deny the permit request because the proposed house would inten-
sify development in the coastal zone and would interfere with visual
access to the ocean. This interest is a public value of recognized and
significant importance. Second, the Commission argued that the access
condition was only a less-intrusive mitigation strategy that allowed the
Nollans to proceed with their development plans, despite the Commis-
sion's authority to disapprove the proposed intensification of use.
The Court's response to the Commission's position revealed its view
of exactions as legitimate police power regulations. First, the Court
stated that if California had required the Nollans to provide the public
with a permanent easement across their property, the Act would con-
stitute a taking. The majority equated such a requirement with the
permanent physical occupation taking cases, such as Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corporation. 121 The issue was whether re-
quiring an uncompensated conveyance as a condition for issuing a land
use permit amounts to a taking. 122 For purposes of its analysis, the
Court accepted that the Commission could have lawfully denied the
Nollan's application for a permit to build a larger house on the lot.
Then, in perhaps the most important passage in the opinion, the Court
held that the Commission's power to limit development "must surely
include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the
owner, even a concession ofproperty rights, that serves the same end.'1 23
For municipalities, the Court's statement is a welcome endorsement
of the use of the police power to mitigate the impact of growth through
a program of exactions. The Court stated that if a regulatory limita-
tion was valid, then an exaction that serves the same end is also
valid. 124 The Court held that this statement of the law is correct, even
121. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (cited at 107 S. Ct. at 3145).
122. 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
123. Id. at 3148 (emphasis added).
124. The Court stated:
If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise
of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that
providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the
same purpose is not.
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if the exaction would constitute a compensable taking.125
The opinion failed to indicate how strong the nexus must be between
the exaction and the stated public purpose. The Court phrased the
question as, "what type of connection between the regulation and the
state interest satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantially ad-
vance' the latter." 126 It is unclear whether a rational nexus suffices, as
the phrase "utterly fails" implies, 127 or whether the Court has, by vir-
tue of its exacting review of the Commission's legislative and factual
judgments, erected a new standard of judicial review.
It would be easy to conclude that the Court did not intend to estab-
lish a rule of strict scrutiny and that the unique facts of the instant case
were so extreme that the Court found that the Commission had utterly
failed to establish any nexus between the condition and the stated legit-
imate interest. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued forcefully that
the majority opinion required a precise fit in support of an exaction.
The majority opinion failed to rebut this challenge despite Justice
Scalia's attempts to respond to Justice Brennan's dissent. 121
For the purposes of its analysis, the Court accepted the Commis-
sion's assertion that the access condition would be valid if it were rea-
sonably related to the avowed public purpose. The Court stated that
the standard of review that it applied was of little importance because it
found the instant case unable to meet even the most untailored
standards. ' 29
According to the Court, in order to justify the permit condition, the
Commission advanced the public objective of maintaining visual access
to the ocean. Apparently, the Court accepted the proffered objective as
legitimate and sufficient to justify denial of the Nollans' permit request.
Notwithstanding its acceptance of the Commission's goal of preserving
visual access to the beach and ocean, the Court found that:
[i]t is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that peo-
ple already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nol-
125. Id. at 3147. The Court held:
a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a re-
fusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the
permit would not constitute a taking.
Id.
126. Id.
127 Id. at 3148.
128. Id. at 3154-56, 3147 n.3.
129, Id. at 3148.
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Ian's property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created
by the new house.130
Overlooking the imprudence of invoking the word "impossible" in
this day and age, the Court's holding is difficult to understand. First,
with little difficulty, Justice Brennan does the impossible by outlining
several ways in which the condition mitigates the adverse impacts of
the construction of a house five times the size of the prior structure.1 31
While the justifications Justice Brennan described may fall short of
self-evident truths, they clearly exceed the absolutist meaning of the
word "impossible." Moreover, it defies logic to suggest that giving the
public a viewing place on the Nollans' lot, seaward of the new house,
would fail to eliminate an obstacle to viewing the beach. The major-
ity's explicit statement that providing a viewing spot on the Nollans'
property would be constitutional1 32 accentuates the illogic of the
Court's position. 133 It is one thing for the Court to disagree with the
wisdom and judgment of a co-equal branch of government; it is quite
another to reach a conclusion of impossibility.
It is difficult to read the majority opinion without recalling the hal-
cyon days of "substantive due process" and wondering what happened
to the oft-repeated and well-settled proposition that the Court must
refrain from sitting as a super-legislature.1 34 On its face, the proposi-
tion that a majority of the Court actually intends to establish a takings
clause standard of review that harkens back to a much-maligned era of
judicial "super legislatures" is unthinkable. Yet, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens clearly believe that the majority is
serious, and in a footnote rebuttal to Brennan's dissent, Justice Scalia
does not disabuse the reader of an apparent invocation of strict judicial
scrutiny.1 35 Worse still, the majority opinion appears to say that it is
serious about strict scrutiny, under some undefined circumstances.
The majority states:
[O]ur cases describe the condition for 'substantial advance[ment]'
130. Id. at 3149.
131. Id. at 3154-56.
132. Id. at 3148.
133. How could a viewing spot be more effective in providing visual access to the
ocean and less intrusive of the Nollans' privacy, than providing a viewing spot that is
seaward of the Nollans' seawall and accessible not by trespassing through the Nollans'
yard but by going along the beach from public holdings to the north and south of the
Nollan lot?
134. Day Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
135. 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3.
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of a legitimate State interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of prop-
erty is made a condition to the lifting of a land use restriction,
since in that context there is a heightened risk that the purpose is
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated
police power objective. 136
Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest that the Court, if faced with a
less extreme set of facts, would hold that a development condition in-
volving a concession of property rights need only bear a rational rela-
tionship to the public interest that is intended to be served. Only those
exactions which "utterly fail" to relate to the stated purpose will be
invalid.
The Nollan case may not represent a significant departure from set-
tled principles of law-an exaction is constitutional, as is any other
regulation, if it bears a rational relationship to, or substantially ad-
vances a legitimate public interest that unmitigated development would
otherwise threaten.
More important than the decision itself, however, may be the signifi-
cance of Nollan in the context of the Court's decision in First English.
The Court in First English failed to explain the circumstances under
which it would determine that a regulation destroyed all uses of prop-
erty. Alternatively, the Court failed to clarify what uses it would con-
sider sufficient to avoid imposing the taking label. The Nollan case
suggests that, like those of Mark Twain's demise, reports of the down-
fall of restrictive land use controls were premature. Both the majority
opinion and Justice Brennan's dissent assume without discussion that
the Coastal Commission could have lawfully denied the Nollans' appli-
cation for a permit without depriving them of all use of their prop-
erty. 137 It is true that the Court abstained from ruling that the permit
denial constituted a taking. Nevertheless, the majority recognized the
136. Id. at 3150.
137. Id. at 3148, 3152. The Court stated:
The Commission argues that these permissible purposes include protecting the
public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychologi-
cal barrier' to using the beach created by a development shorefront, and preventing
congestion on the public beaches. We assume, without deciding, that this is so-in
which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their
permit outright if their new house (alone, or by reason of cumulative impact pro-
duced in conjunction with other construction) would substantially impede these pur-
poses, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their
property as to constitute a taking.
Id. at 3147 (emphasis added).
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validity of the outright denial of the permit. This is particularly evi-
dent in light of Justice Brennan's dissent and the majority's rebuttal of
those portions of Brennan's opinion. 138
In his dissent, without the qualifier the majority invoked, Justice
Brennan stated that "[t]he Coastal Commission... could have denied
the Nollans' request for a development permit, since the property would
have remained economically viable without the requested new develop-
ment." '139 Since the bungalow on the lot was in disrepair and incapable
of being rented," the other viable uses Justice Brennan deemed consti-
tutionally sufficient to avoid a regulatory taking did not involve what
the real estate industry conceives of as economically viable uses.
More importantly, Justice Brennan deliberately considered the con-
cerns that underlie the Court's taking jurisprudence. First, Justice
Brennan clarified that notwithstanding the contrary implication in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,"' a physical intru-
sion does not necessarily constitute a compensable event. 142 This prop-
osition gains significance because the author of the majority in Loretto,
Justice Marshall, joined in Brennan's dissenting opinion in Nollan.
Moreover, Justice Brennan stressed the importance of whether the gov-
ernmental activity that burdens private use is a result of a private initi-
ative to intensify use of the property. If it is, Brennan expressly stated
that the limitations are less likely to constitute a regulatory taking. 143
1 In addition, Justice Brennan took a sharp look at the economic im-
pacts of the regulation at issue and measured them in the context of the
average reciprocity of advantage. In doing so, he clearly indicates that
a balancing of public interests is appropriate. Justice Brennan implies
that the Court would sustain restrictive regulation if the economic im-
pact to the landowner is less than the public harm sought to be
avoided.'" The economic impact is not an absolute element in the
Brennan equation for a regulatory taking. He stated, "Ultimately, ap-
pellants' claim of economic injury is flawed because it rests on the as-
sumption of entitlement to the full value of their new development."145
138. Id. at 3154-56, 3147 n.3.
139. Id. at 3152 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 3143.
141. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
142. 107 S. Ct. at 3157.
143. Id. at 3158.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Finally, Justice Brennan discussed the concept of investment-backed
expectations. He explained that the reasonableness of such expecta-
tions depends upon the prevailing planning and regulatory climate and
that state policy, expressed by statute or constitution, prescribes the
legitimacy of development expectations. In other words, compensable
interests may not be formed in contradiction of state policy or law.
It is clear that Brennan does not view construction of improvements
as an immutable right of property.' 46 In summary, Brennan reveals
that his theory of temporary regulatory takings is nothing more than
the constitutional imperative that if a regulation goes too far, compen-
sation is required. Few well-conceived regulations are likely to have
such an effect:
I believe that States should be afforded considerable latitude in
regulating private development, without fear that their regulatory
efforts will often be found to constitute a taking. 147
III. WHAT DoEs IT ALL MEAN?
It is not easy to comprehend the implications of the seven opinions
that comprise the trilogy, and it is even more difficult to synthesize the
three cases. Nevertheless, there are a number of obvious points that
warrant discussion.
What does the trilogy mean? Does it represent a significant turning
point in the law, or is it simply a restatement of well-settled principles?
The answer is relatively simple with regard to Keystone. The legal
principles advanced are basically consistent with prior decisions, and
the only remarkable aspect of the case is the outcome in light of the
result in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. 4 8 In Nollan the Court ventured
into the novel area of exactions, and the opinion was surprisingly sup-
portive of local land use regulation. Few commentators would have
predicted that a conservative appointee to the Court would approve of
the provision of a viewspot on the owner's lot as an appropriate condi-
tion to the building permit.
It is more difficult to characterize First English. Depending on how
one reads the case, First English is either a simple restatement of an
established principle of law or a dramatic turning point in land use law.
The national press and others believe that the Court reached the heart
146. Id. at 3160 n.10.
147. Id. at 3162.
148 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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of the taking issue, while others contend that the case adds little to
taking jurisprudence.
Although the majority opinion raised some doubt in First English, it
appears that the Court has reaffirmed that the analysis of alleged regu-
latory takings is distinct from the analysis appropriate for physical oc-
cupation takings. For physical occupations, an actual invasion
constitutes a taking unless the taking is militated as a development per-
mit condition that substantially advances a legitimate public purpose as
defined in Nollan. The analysis of whether a particular regulatory ac-
tion effects a taking turns on the economic impact of the action, unless
there is a countervailing public policy basis, such as normal delay or
safety, to sustain the limitation.
In First English the Court implied that a regulation that deprives a
property owner of all use of his property, for even a limited period of
time, constitutes a taking. Moreover, the Court undermines the "all
use" analysis by pointing out at least two situations where it would not
apply: required safety actions and normal delays. Nevertheless, a reg-
ulation that deprives a property owner of all use of his property is
likely to be a taking except in very limited circumstances. In Keystone
the Court failed to address directly the question of what would consti-
tute a taking, because the Court found that the statute in question
presented no real danger of effecting a taking.
It is also clear, notwithstanding the Chief Justice's dissent in Key-
stone, that a regulatory taking analysis does not focus on the discrete
units of property that have been restricted. Rather, the analytical unit
of property is the owner's entire parcel; in Keystone the relevant unit of
property was all of the Coal Association's holdings. It is unclear, how-
ever, how courts should determine the unit of property when the prop-
erty owner owns only an individual segment of property. Consider, for
example, how courts would identify the unit of property if the plaintiff
in Penn Central owned only the air rights above Grand Central Sta-
tion. Would the unit of property be limited to the air rights? Could a
clever litigant alter the unit of property by selling the support estate to
a third party?
In a final analysis, the cases mean that the Court is still confused and
grasping for a doctrinal basis for resolving the taking issue. In part, the
analytical problems the Court experiences are the natural product of
attempting to resolve the taking issue by building on an erroneous and
misplaced view of Pennsylvania Coal. Indeed, the Court's difficulties in
articulating a coherent set of taking principles is due to the faulty
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premise on which the Court bases its contemporary taking jurispru-
dence. More specifically, that faulty premise is that Justice Holmes
intended to hold that a regulation that goes too far effects a taking.
The plain language of Holmes' opinion belies that supposition, and the
failure to recognize this doctrinal flaw condemns the Court's analysis
to tautology. The simple fact is that Holmes used the word "taking" in
a metaphorical sense throughout the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, and
the failure to accept the plain language of the opinion in pari materia
has much to do with the muddled state of the law of the taking issue.
That is not to say that a regulation can never effect a taking. Rather,
the point is that the taking issue emanates from sources other than
Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, and other
precedents more clearly define the contours of the law of regulatory
takings. The origins of contemporary taking jurisprudence are, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in First English, 49 found in Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co. 5 o In Pumpelly a property owner demanded compensa-
tion for the total destruction of his property resulting from governmen-
tal action. The Supreme Court recognized that the taking clause
constrained governmental power. The Court held in Pumpelly that the
fact that the government refrained from instituting eminent domain
proceedings failed to negate the constitutional imperative for
compensation. 15'
On many occasions, the Court has reaffirmed the principle laid down
in Pumpelly. In addition, United States v. Clarke'5 2 points out that
governmental actions other than condemnation proceedings may re-
quire payment of just compensation. The use of airspace' 53 is another
familiar example of a deprivation of private property recognized as a
taking even though the landowners refrained from initiating condem-
nation proceedings. Thus, Pumpelly and its progeny established that
149. 107 S. Ct. 2378.
150, 13 Wall. 166 (1872).
151. Id. at 177-78. The Court found:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if... it shall be held that if the
government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of
the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent
injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making
any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for
the public use.
Id.
152. 445 U.S. 253 (1980).
153. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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governmental actions other than exercises of the power of eminent do-
main, including regulations, may effect a taking.
The Pumpelly principle does not mean that a regulation limiting pri-
vate use necessarily effects a taking. Given the nature of the interfer-
ences which characterized the takings in cases such as Pumpelly, it is
difficult to equate a regulation that temporarily displaces a landowner's
private use of his property with one that allows flooding, total destruc-
tion and aviation use. Yet that is the leap of faith that the Court appar-
ently hopes to achieve in First English.
Recognizing the implication of the Court's opinion, the dissent in
First English argued that the mere interference in use does not amount
to a taking. The dissent's discussion of the value of property in the
dimension of time seems logical and consistent with the Court's prece-
dents. Therefore, it would be imprudent to assume that the Court has
actually rejected this analysis. To the contrary, it seems logical to infer
that the First English Court intentionally ignored the question of
whether the challenged regulations which temporarily deprived the
owner of all use of his property constituted a taking.
What is needed is a more precise and careful analysis of the taking
issue and a holding that encompasses an alleged taking without a phys-
ical occupation. The Court correctly pointed out that the nature of the
analysis is basically economic. This form of analysis, however, is not
absolute due to the temporal nature of regulatory impacts, as well as
the possibility of an overriding public interest. Of course, if a regula-
tion goes beyond simply limiting private use and commands public use
or total destruction of a property interest, then courts should find a
taking. On the other hand, if the only impact on property is a tempo-
rary interference, then the established principle that a mere diminution
in value is not a taking means that on remand the regulation in First
English will fall short of a taking.
For decades, the taking issue has raised controversy among land use
scholars and practitioners. Nothing the Court did in the 1987 taking
issue trilogy lessened the zeal of the advocates and debaters. In other
words, Yogi Berra was right: "It ain't over 'til it's over."
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